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Abstract
Disasters triggered by natural hazards will increase in the future due to climate change, population growth, and more
valuable assets located in vulnerable areas. The impacts of disasters on political conflict have been the subject of broad
academic and public debates. Existing research has paid little attention to the links between climate change, disasters,
and small-scale conflicts, such as protests or riots. Floods are particularly relevant in this context as they are the most
frequent and most costly contemporary disasters. However, they remain understudied compared to other disasters,
specifically, droughts and storms. We address these gaps by focusing on flood-related political unrest between 2015
and 2018 in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Drawing on data from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO) and
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), we find that flood-related political unrest occurs within two
months after 24% of the 92 large flooding events recorded in our sample. Subsequently, a qualitative comparative
analysis (QCA) shows that the simultaneous presence of a large population, a democratic regime, and either the
exclusion of ethnic groups from political power or a heavy impact of the flood is an important scope condition for the
onset of flood-related political unrest. This indicates that disaster–conflict links are by no means deterministic.
Rather, they are contingent on complex interactions between multiple contextual factors.
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Introduction
The security implications of climate change have received
public and academic attention for more than a decade
(McDonald, 2013; von Uexkull & Buhaug, 2021), but
high-ranking decisionmakers have become particularly
interested in the topic in the recent years. In 2018, Swe-
den initiated the third United Nations Security Council
debate on climate change and security, and Germany
maintained the momentum by prioritizing this topic for
its two-year membership in the Council (Auswärtiges
Amt, 2019). In these debates, disasters play a particularly
prominent role (Peters, 2018). Disasters are defined in
this study as complex emergencies that result when
destructive natural hazards strike vulnerable socio-
economic systems (Cohen & Werker, 2008).
The incidence and intensity of disasters have been on
the rise for approximately 30 years (Formetta & Feyen,
2019). On the one hand, this increase reflects the greater
number of natural hazards due to climate change. On the
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other, it mirrors the fact that larger populations are
exposed to such hazards, due to, for example, population
growth and urbanization, particularly in vulnerable areas
like coasts and floodplains. Persistent socio-economic
inequalities further compound the problem, since poor
and marginalized populations are particularly vulnerable
to natural hazards (Wisner et al., 2004).
For many years, the literature has been characterized
by controversies over the existence and strength of disas-
ter–conflict links (Xu et al., 2016). Based on qualitative
case studies, some scholars argue that migration flows
and grievances caused by droughts contributed to the
onset of the civil wars in Sudan (2003) and Syria
(2011), while others consider droughts, at best, as very
minor drivers of these conflicts (for overviews, see: De
Juan, 2015; Ide, 2018). Cross-case research is equally
equivocal: quantitative studies have reported a positive
association between disasters and armed conflict (e.g.
Brancati, 2007; Kikuta, 2019; Nel & Righarts, 2008),
no association (e.g. Bergholt & Lujala, 2012; Omeli-
cheva, 2011; Petrova, 2021), and even a negative asso-
ciation (Slettebak, 2012). More recent research indicates
that disasters increase the risk of armed conflict onset,
but that this link is weak and strongly dependent on
scope conditions (Ide et al., 2020a; Schleussner et al.,
2016; von Uexkull et al., 2016).
In this article, we analyze the frequency of and con-
ditions for the onset of flood-related political unrest. By
studying political unrest linked to floods, which are
climate-related disasters,1 we enrich the debates on both
the disaster–conflict links and climate security more
broadly (although the impact of climate change on the
floods in our sample cannot be clearly discerned yet).
Specifically, we make the following contributions.
We analyze one specific and underexplored disaster
type: floods. Floods are the most frequent disaster result-
ing from natural hazards and affect more people than any
other disaster type. Between 1998 and 2017, at least
3,148 floods occurred worldwide (43.4% of all natural
disasters), affecting two billion people in total (45% of all
disaster-affected people) and causing 142,088 deaths
directly (11% of all disaster-related deaths). In terms of
economic costs, during the same period, floods caused
destruction to the amount of 656 billion US dollars
(Wallemacq & House, 2018) – roughly equivalent to
Switzerland’s entire GDP in 2017. Until 2050, 300 mil-
lion additional people will be exposed to high flood risks
due to climate change-induced sea-level rise (Kulp &
Strauss, 2019).
This notwithstanding, research on climate security
and disaster–conflict links have primarily focused on
droughts (e.g. Bagozzi, Koren & Mukherjee, 2017; De
Juan & Hänze, 2021; Helman, Zaitchik & Funk, 2020;
Linke & Ruether, 2021). Some studies find that strong
storms (Ide et al., 2020a) and above-average precipita-
tion (Nordkvelle, Rustad & Salmivalli, 2017) – both of
which often cause floods – increase civil conflict risks.
However, floods can also occur outside of these weather
conditions, and storms as well as heavy precipitation
events can take place without the occurrence of floods.
Intense rainfall does not necessarily produce flooding
(e.g. when soil, vegetation or streams absorb the preci-
pitation), and floods often occur in the absence of storms
(e.g. riverine floods) or heavy precipitation (e.g. when
dry, bare, and rocky soils cannot absorb much water).
Therefore, an analysis that is specifically focused on
floods is all the more important.
The two studies closest to our research are by Ghimire
and colleagues (Ghimire & Ferreira, 2016; Ghimire,
Ferreira & Dorfman, 2015). In statistical analyses span-
ning 126 countries in 1985–2009, both studies find that
large floods increase the risk of armed conflict intensity,
but not onset. While Ghimire et al. have significantly
advanced the literature on disaster–conflict links, we
expand the research frontier in three major ways.
First, we study a dependent variable that is largely
neglected in the literature. Flood-related political unrest
refers to protests, demonstrations, or riots that link their
demands or complaints explicitly to a flood event. As
such, our study generates new theoretical insights and
empirical evidence on a conflict category that is of lower
intensity than those conventionally analyzed, yet still
politically relevant. With few exceptions (e.g. Hendrix
& Salehyan, 2012; Ide et al., 2020b), prior research on
disasters and conflict has focused on armed conflict cate-
gories that involve at least one organized group, often
passing the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. This is
certainly true for prior studies on floods and conflict (but
see Petrova, 2021). Our analysis of political unrest con-
tributes evidence to the growing literature on low-
intensity conflict. Political unrest can be a driver of social
change (Kadivar & Caren, 2016; Koubi et al., 2021) and
can be a starting point for large-scale civil conflict (e.g.
Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Cunningham et al.,
2017). Furthermore, early environmental security
research has encouraged scholars to study low-intensity
conflicts, as these are most likely to be affected by envi-
ronmental stress (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
1 Disasters are climate-related if the natural hazard triggering the
disasters is related to climatic conditions like precipitation and wind.
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Second, the focus on flood-related unrest avoids one
important attribution problem that characterizes prior
cross-case research on climate security and disaster–con-
flict links, including research on floods. Even if a disaster
caused by a natural hazard precedes a conflict, we do not
know whether the disaster was indeed associated with the
conflict. Quantitative research addresses this problem by
using significance tests and large samples (see Selby,
2014 for a critique). Here, we follow a different
approach: we rely on rich qualitative data to produce a
list of unrests that are explicitly related to floods.
Third, Xu et al. (2016) highlight that our understand-
ing of the contextual factors that determine disaster–con-
flict links remains limited. This is also true for the broader
climate security literature (Buhaug, 2016; Mach et al.,
2019). Extant research tends to focus on whether (rather
than in which contexts) floods affect conflict risks. Here,
by contrast, we study the conditions under which flood-
related political unrest occurs. To do so, we employ qua-
litative comparative analysis (QCA), a method geared to
detecting complex and context-dependent causal relations
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
The geographical scope of our analysis spans Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia. This range covers many countries
and regions that are currently unexplored by both disaster–
conflict and climate–conflict research (Adams et al., 2018).
We find that flood-related political unrest occurs in 24% of
all cases in our sample. However, one should consider that
we only focus on major floods (92 occurrences in the coun-
tries under study from 2015 to 2018). Importantly, our
study also demonstrates that the flood–unrest link is not
deterministic – it depends on complex interactions
between multiple contextual factors. In particular, the
simultaneous presence of a large population, a democratic
political system (understood in an electoral, minimalist
sense), and either a heavy flood impact or ethnopolitical
exclusion is an important scope condition for the occur-
rence of flood-related political unrest. As such, our findings
advance extant research, which has paid limited attention
to floods and to vulnerability factors for disaster–conflict
links. Additionally, we enrich debates about whether
democracies or autocracies (Flores & Smith, 2013; Wood
& Wright, 2016), and whether intense or mild events
(Salehyan & Hendrix, 2014) increase the probability that
floods lead to political conflict.
When do floods cause political unrest?
We follow the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Dataset’s (ACLED) definition of political unrest as a
violent or nonviolent demonstration for political causes
(Raleigh et al., 2010). Political causes include demands
for or opposition against specific forms of governance,
policies, laws, or regulations. If these demands (or oppos-
ing claims) explicitly refer to floods (e.g. calls for higher
compensation or better disaster risk reduction policies),
we consider such events as flood-related political unrests.
Consider a brief example from our dataset (see Online
appendix 3). After a flood struck Khwaja Baha Wuddin
district in northeastern Afghanistan, killing 72 people
and displacing 4,000, the residents of the Shour Toghi
area accused the government of not providing sufficient
compensation. Subsequently, the aggrieved residents
staged a protest to articulate their demands on 21 May
2018. The protest was shut down by the Afghan army,
leaving four demonstrators wounded.
Floods can increase the likelihood of political unrest
through several, often intertwined pathways. Like other
forms of disasters, they can generate grievances due to
human and socio-economic losses (Cassar, Healy & von
Kessler, 2017). If public institutions or other social
groups are considered responsible for the disasters – for
instance, due to insufficient preparation, late and inade-
quate relief, and biased reconstruction efforts – such
grievances might result in protests (Ide et al., 2020b).
Flood-related migration can also be a source of discon-
tent, both among the displaced population (which may
perceive existing support as inadequate) and among peo-
ple in the destination areas (which may oppose the
inflow of ‘outsiders’) (Ghimire, Ferreira & Dorfman,
2015; Koubi et al., 2021; Petrova, 2021).
Additionally, the disaster sociology literature suggests
that community coherence increases in the first months
after a disaster, while community groups and NGOs
support the organization of affected people (Gawronski
& Olson, 2013; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1976). This
might facilitate the articulation of grievances and coor-
dination of protests. It is important to note, however,
that the coherence and solidarity fostered by disasters
may also lead to reduced conflict, including protests,
although the evidence for this disaster diplomacy
hypothesis is at best mixed (Kelman, 2012).
We argue that floods are only likely to cause political
unrest under specific circumstances. Some of these are
highly idiosyncratic (e.g. the behavior of local state rep-
resentatives, household vulnerability to floods, intactness
of traditional institutions) and are hence difficult to ana-
lyze in a cross-case global study. However, we theorize
that there are some systematic and partly interacting
vulnerability factors at the macro or meso levels that
increase the likelihood of flood-related unrest. We sug-
gest five such conditions to be particularly salient.
Ide et al. 85
Heavy impact (Impact): the impact of a flood refers to
the loss of lives, livelihoods, and assets, as well as the
(often temporary) displacement of households. Due to
the availability of reliable data, we will focus on fatalities
and displaced people in our empirical analysis. All else
being equal, a strong impact of a flood (indicating a
severe hazard and/or a high vulnerability) should increase
the likelihood of unrest. More affected or displaced peo-
ple implies a larger group of potential participants in
protests, more severe grievances, and stronger support
for and organization among affected groups (Gawronski
& Olson, 2013).
Exclusion of ethnic groups from political power
(Excluded): various studies conclude that the exclusion
of politically relevant ethnic groups from political power
is an important predictor of disaster-related armed con-
flict (Ide et al., 2020a; von Uexkull et al., 2016). We
posit that such ethnopolitical exclusion also relates to
small-scale unrest. Discriminated groups are often more
vulnerable to flood hazards and are less likely to receive
state-sponsored relief (Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). In
some cases, governments may even restrict international
aid and NGO access to disaster-affected areas populated
by such excluded groups (Zeccola, 2011). Flood-related
grievances are thus magnified among excluded groups,
adding to the already existing resentment against the
(excluding) government, and thus increasing the likeli-
hood of unrest.
Large population (Population): this condition partially
overlaps with Impact, since floods tend to have stronger
impacts in areas with large populations. However,
unequally distributed vulnerabilities to floods can lead
to very different outcomes among areas with similar
population sizes (Wisner et al., 2004). Furthermore,
larger populations are characterized by greater demo-
graphic heterogeneity. Increasing heterogeneity, in turn,
implies greater diversity in political preferences and
demands (Alesina et al., 2003), and hence diversity in
reactions to floods. Therefore, by virtue of sheer num-
bers, larger populations will have a higher likelihood of
some individuals or groups reacting to floods with
government-focused resentment. Likewise, larger popu-
lations will have a greater number of individuals willing
and able to commit their time to a demonstration in
response to a flood, despite the fact that the opportunity
costs of doing so are higher due to the need to recover
after the flood (Salehyan & Hendrix, 2014). Therefore,
we expect large populations to increase the likelihood of
unrest.
Presence of a democratic regime (Democratic): the
nature of the political system likely shapes the responses
of states and citizens to a disaster, and hence the like-
lihood of flood-related unrest. The direction of this
impact, however, remains unclear. On the one hand,
flood-related protests might be more common in democ-
racies because the risks of repression are lower (Flores &
Smith, 2013) and leaders are (perceived to be) more
responsive to public outcries (Apodaca, 2017). Demo-
cratic governments also have to provide resources to
broader constituencies and cannot bias their policies
heavily towards specific (disaster-affected) groups in
order to prevent unrest (Hendrix & Haggard, 2015).
Autocratic regimes, on the other hand, provide fewer
formal options for citizens to express grievances (Ide
et al., 2020b), which may also incentivize political unrest
following floods. Furthermore, autocracies are more
likely to respond to disasters in repressive ways, which
could provoke unrest (Pfaff, 2019; Wood & Wright,
2016). We therefore include this condition in our analy-
sis without a directional expectation.
Level of economic development (GDP): major disas-
ters, including floods, tend to occur more frequently in
economically less developed countries. Poor people often
live in areas at risk of disaster (such as floodplains) due to
a lack of alternative settlement and livelihoods options
and have fewer means to prepare for or cope with dis-
asters. The respective states often also lack the means to
finance sufficient preparation, early warning, relief, and
recovery systems, in particular for rapid-onset events like
floods (Mehrabi et al., 2019; Wisner et al., 2004). The
combination of personal and livelihood loss as well as
dire recovery prospects with insufficient state responses
can trigger a sense of frustration among the flood-
affected groups (Carlin, Love & Zechmeister, 2014).
Low levels of economic development might therefore
promote flood-related political unrest.
Naturally, there are other factors relevant for the
occurrence of flood-related political unrest, several of
which we account for in the robustness tests, such as
agricultural dependence, geographic location, or state
capacity (see below). Nevertheless, we consider the five
above conditions particularly relevant, for two reasons.
First, they are among the most salient conflict-related
factors discussed in existing literature on disasters and
conflicts. Second, these conditions are likely to interact
with, and hence reinforce, each other. For instance, large
populations might be an important pre-condition for the
emergence of flood-related protests, but without strong
grievances fueled by ethnic exclusion or low levels of
development, they are unlikely to be sufficient driving
factors for the onset of unrest (and vice versa). The
method we employ is particularly sensitive to such
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interactions. In addition, we include only five conditions
in the main analysis because using a larger number of
factors might result in overloaded models (Achen, 2005;
Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).
Data and methods
QCA in a nutshell
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a configura-
tional comparative research approach and data analysis
technique. QCA is based on set theory, requiring the
researcher to decide for each case (e.g. a flood event)
whether it belongs to a certain set of cases (e.g. those
that experienced flood-related unrest) or not. This is the
calibration process. Partial or fuzzy set memberships are
possible, but given that our outcome is binary (onset of
flood-related unrest or not), all conditions (akin to inde-
pendent variables) have to be binary as well (crisp-set
QCA) (Ragin, 2009). Once the calibration is complete,
a ‘truth table’ can be created, listing all possible combi-
nations of conditions and the cases that are members of
the respective set (the truth table for this study is pro-
vided in Online appendix 5).
In the next step, a logical minimization procedure is
applied to these combinations (or truth table rows) via
the Quine McCluskey algorithm, usually by a software
(fsQCA 3.0 in our case). The reasoning behind the pro-
cedure is that if truth table rows ‘differ in only one causal
condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal
condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be
considered irrelevant and can be removed’ (Ragin, 1987:
93). The solution formula resulting from the logical
minimization procedure describes the combinations of
conditions quasi-sufficient for (and hence in a consistent
subset-relation with) the outcome. QCA also allows for
identifying necessary or quasi-necessary conditions by
ascertaining whether certain conditions are in a consis-
tent superset relation to the outcome (Legewie, 2013).
In addition to being able to distinguish between nec-
essary and sufficient conditions, QCA offers several other
distinct advantages in the study of disaster–conflict links.
Most notably, QCA is geared towards detecting complex
causal relations that are dependent on the simultaneous
presence and/or absence of several factors (conjunctural
causation), rather than analyzing linear relations or inter-
actions between only two or three variables (Schneider &
Wagemann, 2012). Further, the method allows us to
infer conclusions from a broader set of cases, hence
potentially increasing its generalizability when compared
to small-N designs. QCA is thus highly suitable for our
study focused on the (interacting) contextual factors that
produce flood-related political unrest. The suitability of
QCA is further reinforced by recent studies that show
disaster–conflict links to be strongly context-dependent
(e.g. Ide et al., 2020a; Schleussner et al., 2016; von
Uexkull et al., 2016).
Although QCA has recently been successfully employed
in the wider field of environmental security research (e.g.
Bretthauer, 2015; Hossu et al., 2018; Ide et al., 2020b), it
has also faced criticisms. Some scholars have noted that
QCA is not sufficiently robust (Hug, 2013) and others
have highlighted that QCA is inattentive to actual causal
links (Munck, 2016). We address these concerns with
multiple robustness checks as well as by focusing on a
sample where the existence of causal links (between floods
and flood-related unrest) is established in principle.
Sample
Our unit of analysis is the flooded area in a given country
during the two-month period after a flood event. The
choice of the time lag is data-driven (see Figure 1). While
flood-related political unrest occurred frequently in the
first two months after the start of a flood event, no
additional unrest was traced when extending the lag for
up to six months. Flood data are provided in the form of
polygons by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory dataset
(DFO, 2019), which is currently the best global flood
dataset (Ghimire & Ferreira, 2016). If two or more
flooded areas overlapped within a six-month period,
we merged them into one case adding up the flood
impact and unrest data while taking average values for
all other conditions. We did so because the cases are too
similar to treat as separate. The same procedure was
applied to three additional cases where the minimal dis-
tance between the floods was less than 500km, but the
results remain identical when these are removed from the
sample (see robustness tests in Online appendix 1).
We only considered floods that the DFO assigned a
severity score of at least 1.5. This level of severity indi-
cates a recurrence interval of at least 20 years (i.e. a flood
of this magnitude on average occurs once every 20 years)
and an exceptionally large damage to structures, agricul-
ture or human life. We focused on high-severity floods
because of several reasons. First, although we cannot
entirely rule out this possibility (Wirtz et al., 2014),
severe floods are unlikely to be underreported. Second,
minor floods are less likely to affect conflict dynamics,
both because the hazard itself may be less severe and
because the resilience to hazards may be higher (as men-
tioned above, we study disaster rather than hazard-
related unrest). Granted, multiple minor floods can have
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cumulative impacts reaching the designated level of
major floods. However, since the data on minor floods
is less reliable, coding such multiple (minor) floods is
problematic.
Our analysis focuses on floods recorded in 2015–18.
This is partly determined by the availability of data on
our outcome (i.e. flood-related political unrest as coded
in the ACLED dataset; see below). ACLED provides
data for a very limited set of countries prior to 2015.
Focusing on 2015–18 allows us to include a wide range
of countries in Asia and the Middle East which remain
understudied in both climate security and disaster–con-
flict research (Adams et al., 2018). The analysis covers all
countries in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia for which ACLED and DFO data can
be paired going back to 2015.2 Our total sample con-
tains 92 flood events in 40 countries (see Figure 2).
Data and calibration
We first obtained geo-coded political unrest data from
ACLED, focusing on events categorized as ‘protests’ or
‘riots’ (Raleigh et al., 2010). Subsequently, we evaluated
whether ACLED events were related to floods. We
coded unrest events as ‘flood-related,’ if the following
three criteria were fulfilled: the descriptions provided
by ACLED linked the event directly to a flood, the event
took place in the area affected by the respective flood
(according to DFO’s flood polygons), and the start date
of the flood preceded the unrest by at least one day (and
no more than two months). If all three criteria for at least
one event were fulfilled, we calibrated the respective case
as having experienced flood-related political unrest. Our
estimate of positive cases is conservative because the
ACLED descriptions might not identify every case of
flood-related unrest as such (see Smith, 2014 for similar
considerations) and because we do not include unrest
related to minor floods.
We now turn to the operationalization of the five
causal conditions. Data on the democratic qualities of
a regime (Democratic) was obtained from the Lexical
Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED) dataset (Skaaning,
Gerring & Bartusevičius, 2015). LIED combines partic-
ular features (e.g. presence/absence of multiparty elec-
tions with competitive/non-competitive elections) to
produce concrete regime types (e.g. ‘multiparty auto-
cracy’). These combinations are based on theoretical
considerations over the centrality of specific features to
the concept of democracy. The index both classifies
regimes into qualitatively meaningful types and distin-
guishes between different levels of democracy (from
‘non-electoral autocracy’, coded 0, to ‘polyarchy’, coded
6). As such, LIED is particularly well suited for crisp-set
QCA, which requires the dichotomization of data.
Furthermore, LIED data (version 5.1) is available for the
whole study period. Here, we use 4 as a cut-off point for
the calibration. Countries with a value of 4 or higher
have minimally competitive elections, hence making the
exclusion of larger constituencies (e.g. from flood pre-
ventions and relief measures) politically risky and
enabling the expression of grievances through the elec-
toral system. Furthermore, this choice enables us to
exploit a natural gap in the data as all cases in the sample
have values of 6 (Democratic¼ 1) or below 4 (Democratic
¼ 0). We subject this decision to robustness tests (see
Online appendix 1). Note that this condition reflects a
minimalist understanding of democracy, which centers
on the electoral qualities of regimes, disregarding other
attributes of the concept (e.g. rule of law).
Data on the exclusion of politically relevant ethnic
groups from political power are provided by the Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). To
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Figure 1. Upper panel: Flood-related unrest onsets (y-axis) in
the first 180 days (x-axis) after the start of a major flood.
Lower panel: Flood-related unrest onsets (y-axis) in the first
six months (x-axis) after the start of a major flood
Data sources: ACLED, DFO.
2 With the exception of India and the Philippines, where five floods
that occurred in 2015 (three in India, two in the Philippines) were
excluded from the sample due to lack of ACLED coverage.
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GeoEPR data (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). These are
contained in PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug,
2012), which provides a raster of cells with an edge
length of 0.5 (*55km at the equator) covering the
whole globe. We merged the PRIO-GRID cells with the
DFO flood polygons. We then calibrated cases as char-
acterized by exclusion (Exclusion ¼ 1) if at least one cell
inhabited by an excluded (i.e. ‘discriminated’ or ‘power-
less’) group overlapped with the flooded area. GeoEPR is
available until 2013. Although ethnopolitical status of
groups is not static, such status changes are relatively rare
and most involve one-level shifts (e.g. from ‘powerless’ to
‘discriminated’ or vice versa). Hence, we consider the
status of ethnic groups in 2013 to be a good proxy of
their status in the period 2015–18. Note, however, that
the ERP dataset is not without limitations (Birnir et al.,
2018).
We also draw on PRIO-GRID to determine the total
population living in the flooded area (Population) (2005
values based on CIESIN, 2005). It should be men-
tioned, however, that not all inhabitants are necessarily
impacted by the flood, and that they may not be
affected to the same extent. We added the population
values for all cells that were at least partly overlapping
with the respective DFO flood polygon. While the data
have the disadvantage of being relatively old, they come
with the benefit of having a high spatial resolution. The
crisp-set version of QCA requires us to dichotomize
conditions (Ragin, 2009), posing a challenge, because
population values are continuous. With little theoreti-
cal guidance to inform the cutoff point, we chose a
data-driven procedure as suggested by Basedau & Rich-
ter (2014). As illustrated by Figure 3, the cumulative
number of flood-related unrests rises steeply once the
population living in the affected area exceeds 35 mil-
lion. Consequently, all cases with populations above
35 million were calibrated as having a large population
(Population ¼ 1). In additional analyses reported in
Online appendix 1, we subjected this calibration deci-
sion to robustness tests.
We proxied the impact of a flood (Impact) with two
indicators: fatalities and displacement. A high number of
deaths is often associated with intense grievances and
considerable destruction of property (Cassar, Healy &
von Kessler, 2017). Displacement usually implies
flooded houses as well as commercial, industrial, and
agricultural areas. Since floods are rapid onset events, it
further indicates that people have to leave valuable assets
behind (Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). Displacement is also
a proxy for flood-related migration. Drawing on natural
gaps in the data, we calibrate all floods that caused at least
100 deaths or 30,000 displaced people as heavy impact
(Impact ¼ 1). Again, we assessed the robustness of our
results to different thresholds (see Online appendix 1).
Finally, we used the World Bank’s (2020) data on gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita to operationalize level
of economic development. Although these data disregard
within-country variation, they are suitable to assess our
stated theoretical expectations because they indicate the
wealth (or poverty) of states as well as citizens (UN, n.d.).
The data are also available for the entire period under
study. Using a natural gap in the data, our analysis con-
siders countries with a GDP per capita of more than 2,000
US$ (adjusted for purchasing power parity) as economi-
cally more highly developed. The robustness of this deci-
sion was tested as well (see Online appendix 1).
Prevalence of and conditions for flood-related
political unrest
Findings
The descriptive statistics already reveal several notable pat-
terns (see Online appendix 2 for the full data). First, flood-
related political unrest occurred (in the two-month period
after the beginning of a severe flood) in almost one-quarter
of all our cases (22 out of 92). This finding underscores the
relevance of our analyzed phenomenon. Second, as shown
in Figure 4, flood-related unrest only occurred in 11 of the
40 countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, Ghana, India, Myan-
mar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and
Tunisia. At face value, this suggests that flood-related
unrests did not occur in the remaining countries. However,
previous research indicates that political unrests may be
underreported in autocratic regimes (e.g. Algeria, Iran,
Sudan) because ruling elites often try to prevent reports
about dissent (Böhmelt et al., 2014). Conflict reporting
in fragile countries (e.g. DRC, Somalia, Yemen) is also
Figure 2. Flood cases under study (several flood areas are
overlapping)
Ide et al. 89
often incomplete due to security and access challenges (Ide
& Scheffran, 2014). Furthermore, our strategy for identi-
fying flood-related unrest is already conservative as we
would not detect such unrest after minor floods or if the
flood-related claims are not explicitly articulated. One
should keep this in mind when considering our results.
We now turn to QCA, starting with an analysis of
necessary conditions. A condition is commonly consid-
ered necessary if its consistency score is 0.9 or higher
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The consistency score
can range from 0.0 (indicating that in none of the cases
the condition is present when the outcome is present) to
1.0 (implying that in all the cases where the outcome is
present, the condition is present as well). None of the
conditions pass the 0.9 threshold, although the presence
of a democratic regime (0.86) comes very close.
The analysis of sufficient conditions can draw on differ-
ent types of solutions produced by the QCA algorithm.
Baumgartner & Thiem (2020) find that only the parsimo-
nious solution can reliably uncover patterns of sufficiency.
However, other researchers have disputed this and sug-
gested that the intermediate condition minimizes the risk
of omitting important causal conditions (Dusa, 2019;
Wagemann, Buche & Siewert, 2016). Given this we com-
puted both the parsimonious and the intermediate solu-
tions and found them to be identical for our analysis.3
Table I shows the parsimonious solution yielded by
the QCA algorithm. The solution formula can be read as
follows: a large population and the presence of a
democratic regime in combination with either politically
excluded ethnic groups or a heavy impact of the flood is
quasi-sufficient for the onset of flood-related political
unrest. Level of economic development, by contrast, is
not a relevant causal condition. The consistency score of
1.00 indicates that the solution is free of contradictions,
that is, in all cases where the combination of conditions
is present, the outcome is present as well. The coverage
score of 0.64 indicates that 14 out of 22 unrest cases are
covered by the solution. In addition, the combination of
conditions is present in none of the 70 cases without
unrest.
A closer look at the eight unexplained cases reveals
that they all have a rather small population
(*Population). Furthermore, four of them are non-
democracies (*Democratic) and three are characterized
by the absence of both heavy impacts (*Impact) and
excluded ethnic groups (*Excluded). Ethnographic
research has shown that highly idiosyncratic, micro-
level factors (e.g. local party politics) can shape the pres-
ence of flood-related conflicts (Siddiqi, 2014). Such
factors are likely at play in the eight unexplained cases
and can only be discerned by in-depth, qualitative
research, which goes beyond the scope of this article.
Following standard procedures, we performed a range
of robustness tests, with different frequency thresholds,
different sets of cases, the inclusion of additional causal
conditions, and modifications of the calibration deci-
sions (Cooper & Glaesser, 2016; Skaaning, 2011). The
main solution formula is exactly reproduced by nine out
of 14 alternative tests and in a perfect sub-/super-set
relation with the remaining five, hence indicating a high
degree of robustness (see Online appendix 1 for further
details). The data matrix used for the QCA can be found
in Online appendix 4.
Discussion
In line with our theoretical claims, these results illustrate
that the onset of flood-related political unrest depends
on a complex conjunction of contextual factors. A large
population contains more potential participants in pro-
tests, which are otherwise impeded in post-flood settings
because large parts of the population might be unable or
unwilling to forego recovery work for political activism
(Salehyan & Hendrix, 2014). However, a large popula-
tion alone seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for unrest onset. Additional factors, such as
heavy impact of floods, must be present simultaneously
to generate resentment of sufficient intensity to provoke
unrest.
Figure 3. Population living in the flood-affected area (for each
case in the sample) and cumulative number of flood-related
political unrest cases
3 We used three assumptions to produce the intermediate solution:
the absence of economic development, the presence of ethnic
exclusion from political power, and the presence of a large
population facilitate flood-related unrest.
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Our solution identifies either the exclusion of ethnic
groups from political power or a heavy impact of the
flood as a relevant condition for the onset of flood-
related political unrest. Both conditions are good indi-
cators of grievances, and ethnopolitical exclusion has also
been associated with increased mobilization opportuni-
ties (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). Flood-
related vulnerability, relief efforts, and reconstruction
funds are likely to be unequally distributed along ethnic
lines in societies characterized by ethnopolitical exclu-
sion, thereby compounding existing group-based grie-
vances (von Uexkull et al., 2016). However, even in
the absence of such discrimination, risk reduction and
relief activities are usually perceived as insufficient if the
disaster generates considerable numbers of dead and dis-
placed people (Cassar, Healy & von Kessler, 2017).
The last relevant condition is the presence of a (mini-
mally) democratic regime, which corroborates several
studies that deem such regimes as more vulnerable to
disaster-related conflicts (Apodaca, 2017; Flores &
Smith, 2013). Several mechanisms potentially account
for this. Demonstrations and protests are part of a dem-
ocratic culture; hence, in democratic regimes, citizens
may consider protesting as an adequate means to voice
their discontent following floods. In autocracies, by con-
trast, people face the risk of repression, which potentially
reduces incentives to protest, despite discontent due to
floods. Indeed, some studies show that political repres-
sion (including repression of protesters) increases after
rapid-onset disasters (Wood & Wright, 2016). This
relates to previous research suggesting that unrest events
tend to be underreported in non-democratic regimes
(Böhmelt et al., 2014). In effect, we cannot rule out the
possibility that such reporting bias drives our results per-
taining to the democracy condition. These three expla-
nations (i.e. democratic culture, absence of repression,
reporting bias) are not mutually exclusive.
Unrest events are also often underreported in remote
and sparsely populated areas (Ide & Scheffran, 2014).
Consequentially, one might argue that the relevance of a
large population as a causal condition is driven by similar
reporting biases. While we cannot exclude this possibil-
ity, we consider it unlikely because major disasters, even
in remote areas, receive considerable media and NGO
attention (Zeccola, 2011) and because population size is
a well-established predictor of civil conflict (Dixon,
2009).
Examples from our sample further support these find-
ings: heavy rains caused a flood in the Gagere River in
northern Nigeria in summer 2018. The flood had severe
impacts, resulting in 108 deaths as well as direct eco-
nomic losses of around 75 million US$ among at least
19,000 farmers. The affected area in the northeastern
border region of Nigeria has a long history of
Figure 4. Countries included in the analysis and their unrest/flood ratio
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marginalization and discrimination by the state. Consid-
ering this, grievances were inevitably intense when gov-
ernance assistance was perceived to be slow and
inefficient, with existing democratic institutions being
unable to address these grievances (Sahara Reporters,
2018). The most affected local governance area Goronyo
has a relatively large population of around 250,000 peo-
ple (CityPopulation, 2017) and its main town with the
same name hence served as a crystallization point for
peaceful protests. On August 24, hundreds of flood vic-
tims gathered there to peacefully protest against insuffi-
cient government assistance.
When it comes to individual conditions, our results
contribute to existing debates in three ways. First, pre-
vious studies find that ethnic exclusion from political
power is an important contextual factor for drought–
conflict links (Detges, 2017; Ide et al., 2020a; von
Uexkull et al., 2016). We confirm this insight for
another type of disaster: floods. Second, existing
research disagrees as to whether democratic (Flores &
Smith, 2013; Hendrix & Haggard, 2015) or autocratic
regimes (Ide et al., 2020b; Pfaff, 2019; Wood &
Wright, 2016) are more likely to experience conflicts
after climate-related disasters. Our results support the
former position.
Third, some authors argue that the occurrence of
conflict events in the immediate aftermath of very
intense disasters is less likely because affected people are
preoccupied with securing their livelihoods or express
increased solidarity (Adano et al., 2012; Salehyan &
Hendrix, 2014; Slettebak, 2012). However, we find that
of the 92 severe floods in our sample, unrest occurs in
24% of all cases. Furthermore, a high impact of the flood
increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of flood-
related unrest.
Conclusion
This article provides several contributions to research on
disaster–conflict links as well as the broader field of cli-
mate security. We use QCA to discover conjunctural
causation, which is an important, but so far underex-
plored aspect of climate–conflict and disaster–conflict
links (Mach et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2016). We also focus
on a highly destructive but so far rarely considered type
of disaster (floods), focus on low-intensity conflicts after
disasters (hence complementing existing work on intense
armed conflicts), and avoid attribution problems by
studying, specifically, flood-related unrest.
Our results indicate that low-intensity political unrest
after severe floods occurs relatively frequently. According
to our conservative estimate, at least 24% of the major
floods in our sample are followed by flood-related unrest
in the subsequent two months. The importance of this
finding for the debates on climate change and security is
emphasized by the prediction that flood numbers and
intensity will increase in the future (IPCC, 2014; Kulp
& Strauss, 2019). Currently, however, floods of this
scale have been relatively rare, with only 92 of them
occurring in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia between 2015 and 2018. Given the rele-
vance of flood impact as a causal condition, it is likely
that minor floods trigger political unrest less frequently.
Exploring in detail the links between lower intensity
floods and political unrest remains a task for future
research.
Our results also support voices that reject determinist
linkages between climate change and conflict (e.g. Bar-
nett, 2019; Gleditsch, 2021; Selby, 2014). Even with the
consideration of high-impact events and local diffuse
conflicts that are regarded to be most directly affected







Raw coverage 0.55 0.46
Unique coverage 0.18 0.09
Solution formula Population*Democratic*(ExcludedþImpact) -> Unrest
Solution consistency 1.00
Solution coverage 0.64
Cases not covered 1 (Afghanistan 2018), 13 (Egypt 2016), 14 (Egypt 2015), 57 (Nepal 2016), 62 (Nigeria 2017),
72 (Sierra Leone 2017), 76 (Sri Lanka 2017), 83 (Tunisia 2018)
Contradictory cases None
* ¼ and, þ ¼ or, * ¼ absence of, -> ¼ sufficient for.
Signs follow the predominant current conventions.
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by disasters, the onset of unrest strongly depends on a
combination of specific contextual factors. The simulta-
neous presence of a large population, a democratic
regime (when understood in a minimalist, electoral
sense), and either the exclusion of ethnic groups from
political power or a heavy impact of the flood is crucial
for the onset of flood-related political unrest.
What are the implications of our findings on (low-
intensity) political unrest for the study of civil conflict
writ large? Conflicts that do not reach intensity thresh-
olds of conventional categories of ‘civil conflict’ or ‘civil
war’ are of interest in themselves. Whether involving
violence or not, protests, riots, and other contentious
collective actions can initiate political change or even
contribute to democratization (Kadivar & Caren,
2016). They may also result in considerable socio-
economic disruptions, damage to the economy, aliena-
tion of involved social groups, and – in the case of violent
forms – cause substantial numbers of deaths and injuries
(Salehyan et al., 2012). Importantly, low-intensity polit-
ical unrest may also constitute the first stage of a process
that eventually leads to large-scale organized violence
(Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Cunningham et al.,
2017). Granted, flood-related unrests account for only a
portion of all political unrests, and not every political
unrest turns into a large-scale civil conflict. However,
given the increasing frequency and devastation of floods,
the impacts of flood-related political unrest – both direct
and through the possible contribution to large-scale con-
flict onset – must be considered as of key importance in
the broader conflict research field.
Several blind spots and unanswered questions remain.
After substantial research has been devoted to droughts
and we have contributed to closing the knowledge gap
on floods (see also Ghimire & Ferreira, 2016), a study on
storm-related unrest would further enrich the literature.
This is especially so because storms are climate-related
events and the relationship between storms and armed
conflict has been discussed for a while (Walch, 2018).
Cross-case studies drawing on quantitative data can
mostly identify meso- and macro-level scope conditions
for small-scale conflict onset, even when using a high
spatial resolution. Local (idiosyncratic) conditions
remain important for unrest occurrence (Chenoweth,
Hendrix & Hunter, 2019), and can most likely explain
the eight cases in our sample that remained unexplained
by the QCA. In-depth, qualitative studies could address
such gaps (Adger et al., 2021) and might also be able to
provide important inputs regarding how to solve issues of
conflict underreporting in remote regions and autocratic
states.
We remain optimistic that research along these lines
will further elaborate existing knowledge on climate
change, disasters, and conflict, including the insights
provided by our study. Such knowledge is in high
demand in the political arena (Gilmore et al., 2018) and
could equip decisionmakers with evidence-based tools to
design inclusive and conflict-sensitive policies in a future
likely to be characterized by more (intense) disasters.
Replication data
A description of the robustness tests for the QCA, the
full dataset for the QCA, brief descriptions of the unrest
cases, and the Online appendix can be found at www.
prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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